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MEDIA AND PROPAGANDA
Collective memory as a resource  





Abstract. The paper analyses articles from the Russian language news-
paper “Vesti Segodnya”, which are devoted to the war in Ukraine. The paper 
consists of two parts. The first part of this paper explains how the conceptu-
alization of the information warfare has evolved during the second half of 
the 20th century and how the term “information warfare” is defined in Rus-
sia. Then, by looking at the theoretical foundations of collective memory, it 
demonstrates how collective memory has been incorporated into news stories 
to create resonance with current events in Ukraine. It is concluded that the 
usage of collective memory can be identified in articles devoted to the war in 
Ukraine to resonate with conflict in eastern Ukraine.
Keywords: information warfare, collective memory, Ukraine, discourse, 
political communication.
Introduction
“History must be our guide, if only because nothing else is acces-
sible. Unfortunately, the past as it is interpreted by historians provides 
anything but a reliable compass. The argument either by historical ana-
logy or at the least with illustration by historical anecdote claimed to be 
pertinent, is the rule, not the exception, in political discourse”, writes 
Colin Gray.1 It is true that in journalistic practice a special place has been 
1 Gray, C., S. (2011). Hard Power and Soft Power: the Utility of Military Force as an Instru-
ment of Policy in the 21st Century. Strategic Studies Institute. P. 2.
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devoted to historical analogies or commemoration of historical events. 
And in many cases, officials of different states had used historical events 
and societies’ traumatic past to act on public opinion. In other words, 
collective memory of various societies can be turned into a political as-
set for those in power to achieve political goals. This issue has become 
of particular importance nowadays, when due to the Russian informa-
tion operations, a large number of people living in Eastern Europe has 
been influenced by these information operations. Therefore, the aim of 
this paper is to identify the usage of manipulations of collective mem-
ory in the Russian-language newspaper “Vesti Segodnya”, which is the 
only Russian-language daily newspaper in Latvia. To achieve this aim 
the paper firstly analyzes current theoretical foundations of informa-
tion warfare and the place for collective memory in the arsenal of infor-
mation operations. Secondly, the critical discourse analysis approach 
developed by Norman Fairclough is used to analyse the articles from 
“Vesti Segodnya”. According to this approach, discourse analysis cannot 
be completed only with the help of textual analysis of publications. Fair-
clough argues that research process should involve “an analysis of texts 
as they are embedded within and relate to, social conditions of produc-
tion and consumptions”2. Thus, information provided and interpreted 
by “Vesti Segodnya” is also analyzed in the context of official Russian 
Federation documents: 2008 Russian Foreign Policy Concept3, the 
Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 (approved in 2009)4 and 
the 2013 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept5.
2 Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and power. London: Longman Group UK Limited. P. 
vii.
3 2008 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. Retrieved from: http://archive.kremlin.ru/
eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml
4 Russian National Security Strategy to 2020 (approved in 2009). Retrieved from: 
http://rustrans.wikidot.com/russia-s-national-security-strategy-to-2020
5 2013 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept. Retrieved from: http://archive.mid.ru//
brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D
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Conceptualisation of information warfare
The history of information warfare and information operations 
have a very long past. Nevertheless, information warfare conceptuali-
sations, which would correspond to contemporary circumstances, first 
emerged in the 1980s. Then, the United States Department of Defence 
acknowledged the growing impact of information and communica-
tion technologies on national security in its defence strategies6. Martin 
Libicki is considered as one of the first authors who provided classifica-
tion of information warfare strategies, which would correspond to con-
temporary circumstances. M. Libicki acknowledges the difficulties that 
come with the conceptualisation of the term information warfare. One 
can see legions of hackers uncovering the vulnerabilities of opponents’ 
computer systems that might be exploited by hordes of viruses, worms, 
logic bombs, or Trojan horses as information warfare. At the same, 
time information warfare can be defined as psychological manipulation 
through media.7 
M. Libicki offers information warfare definition, which is developed 
by Thomas Rona. According to it, “information warfare is the strategic, 
operation, and tactical level competitions across the spectrum of peace, 
crisis, crisis escalation, conflict war, war termination, and reconstitu-
tion/restoration, waged between competitors, adversaries or enemies 
using information means to achieve their objectives”.8 Nevertheless, 
for M. Libicki information warfare, as a separate technique of wa ging 
war, does not exist. He considers information warfare as “conflicts 
that involve the protection, manipulation, degradation and denial of 
information”.9 M. Libicki argues that there are several distinct forms 
of information warfare, each laying claim to the larger concept. These 
seven forms are:
6 Libicki, M. (1998). The Future of Information Security. Washington, DC: National De-
fense University. P.1-2.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid. P. 4.
9 Ibid. P. x.
95
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2015 Nr. 8
1) command-and-control warfare – strikes against the enemy’s 
“head and neck”; its objective is to decapitate the enemy’s com-
mand structure from its body of command forces10;
2) intelligence-based warfare – consists of the design, protection, 
and denial of systems that seek sufficient knowledge to dominate 
the battle space; 
3) electronic warfare – usage of radio-electronic and cryptographic 
operational techniques, thus war is waged in the realm of com-
munications11;
4) psychological warfare – information is used to change the minds 
of friends, neutrals, and foes; furthermore, M. Libicki divides 
this form of information warfare into four sub-forms: (a) opera-
tions against the national will; (b) operations against opposing 
commanders; (c) operations against troops; (d) cultural conflict.
5) hacker information warfare – attacks are specific to properties of 
the particular system because the attacks exploit knowable holes 
in the system’s security structure;
6) economic information warfare – blocking information or chan-
nelling it to pursue economic dominance;
7) cyberwarfare – a grab bag of futuristic scenarios12. 
As it can be noticed, M. Libicki provided his conceptualisation of 
information warfare from a strictly military perspective. And since he 
talks about the information war in terms of military and technological 
measures, his conceptualisation of information warfare is also highly 
technological. However, various authors argue that information war-
fare must also be conceptualised in the “non-military environment”. Pa-
tricia Williams, Gary Wheatley, William Hutchinson, Richard Hayes, 
Kenneth Payne, Peter Pomerantsev, Michael Weiss to name only few 
write about “deception”, “information manipulation”, “media war”, 
“perception management”, “communication war”, “weaponisation of 
10 Ibid. P.9.
11 Ibid. P. 27.
12 Ibid. P. 6.
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information”, to suggest that the mass media, including Internet, can 
be used to disseminate propaganda or support deception operations. 
P. Williams argues that although methods of information operations 
and the understanding of their military origins has not changed, the 
manner in which the topics are presented and how these relate to to-
day’s environment and increasingly global society have become a new 
focus13. Already in 1995, Richard Szafranski pointed out that informa-
tion systems are a comprehensive set of knowledges, beliefs, decision-
making process and systems of the adversary. In his work, R. Szafranski 
especially emphasizes the usage of the word “warfare”, which for him 
is not synonymous with “war”. “Warfare does not require a declaration 
of war, nor does it require existence of a condition widely recognized 
as “a state of war”, argues R. Szafranski14. In this sense, warfare can be 
undertaken by or against state-controlled, state-sponsored or non-state 
groups.
Former employee of the United States Department of Defence, Da-
vid Alberts has proposed definition of information warfare, in which 
he argues that information warfare operations traditionally are aimed 
at “decision makers, the information and information-based processes 
they rely on, and their means of communicating their decisions”. Ac-
cording to him, information operations are carried out in the “interac-
tion arenas”, which are not just military, but also economic, political, 
social and ideological.15
Defence analyst Anders Eriksson states that information warfare 
is presented as “an asymmetric strategy”. In the article “Information 
Warfare: Hype or Reality?” he offers to analyse information warfare 
through the theory of network society developed by Manuel Castells. 
A. Eriksson points out that in the network society military assets are be-
ing developed in the light of commercially or publicly available know-
13 Williams, P. (2010). Information Warfare: Time for a redefinition. Edith Cowan University. 
14 Szafranski, R. (1995). A Theory of Information Warfare.
15 Alberts, D. S. (1996). Defensive Information Warfare. Washington, DC: National De-
fense University.
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ledges and technologies. The success of the military, security and de-
fence sectors are guaranteed by a combination of operational activities 
with technological and industrial innovation. This means that in today’s 
world such high standards can be achieved not only by countries, but 
also by NGOs. In the network society power elite does not consist only 
of governments, but also of non-governmental sector.16
Furthermore, the US Department of Defence now characterizes 
information operations as integrated employment of information and 
communication technologies in concert with other lines of operation 
to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adver-
saries and potential adversaries while protecting own information 
environment. According to this scheme, information environment 
includes individuals, organisations, and systems that collect, process, 
disseminate, or act on information. This environment consists of three 
interrelated dimensions, which continuously interact with individuals, 
organisations, and systems. These dimensions are known as physical, 
informational, and cognitive. The physical dimension is composed of 
command and control systems, key decision makers, and supporting 
infrastructure that enable individuals and organisations to create ef-
fects. The informational dimension specifies where and how informa-
tion is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, and protected. The 
cognitive dimension encompasses the minds of those who transmit, 
receive, and respond to or act on information. As such, this dimension, 
according to the US Department of Defence, constitutes the most im-
portant component of the information environment.17
Unlike the works of the US and Western European authors, who 
had paid great attention to military and technological aspects of infor-
mation warfare, Russian authors understand information warfare as 
influen cing consciousness of the masses as part of the rivalry between 
the different civilisational systems adopted by different countries in the 
information space by the use of special means to control information 
16 Eriksson, E. (1990). Information Warfare: Hype or Reality? P. 60.
17 US Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014). Information Operation. Joint Publication 3 – 13. P. I-3.
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resources as information weapons.18 Polish author Jolanta Draczewska 
points out that Russian information warfare theory has long tradition 
in Russia. “It is derived directly from special propaganda theory, which 
was first thought as a separate subject in 1942 at the Military Institute 
of Foreign Languages”, writes Drazewska.19
Igor Panarin (Игорь Панарин) who has managed to compose a 
large number of books and publications on this matter is considered as 
one of the leading information warfare theorists in Russia. In his works, 
Panarin is convinced that political establishment in Western countries 
had been waging information warfare operations against Russia for a 
long period of time. Panarin also provides an outline of the basic in-
struments of information warfare. According to Panarin, these sets of 
instruments that are used in information warfare can be divided into 
different categories: (a) propaganda, which can be “black”, “grey” and 
“white”; (b) intelligence or information gathering about the opponent; 
(c) the analytical component, which consists of media monitoring and 
current situation analysis; (d) the organisational component, which 
means coordination and steering channels, secret agents influencing 
media, which shapes the opinion of politicians and mass media to take 
the shape desired by the state involved in information warfare; (e) other 
combined channels, including special operation forces, which carry out 
different sabotage operations.20
At the same time, another leading information warfare strategist 
from Russia Sergei Rastorguyev (Сергеи Расторгуев) writes that the 
information warfare is conducted into “self-learning information sys-
tems”. He stresses that information warfare does not align with the 
concept used nowadays. Many information warfare techniques were 
already used several thousand years ago, when, according to this author, 
“self-learning information system” started to develop.
18 Draczewska, J. (2014). The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare. The Crimean Ope-
ration, A Case Study. Warsaw: Centre for Eastern Studies. P. 12.
19 Ibid. P. 9.
20 Ibid. P. 15-16.
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According to Rastorguyev, each self-learning information system 
has a different structure. It can be static, dynamic or self-modifying.21 
In every self-learning information system the key concept is know - 
le dges, and protection of these knowledges is one of the cornerstones of 
information warfare. “To win an information warfare means to under-
stand which knowledge is useful to obtain, which data can be processed 
and which – can not”, argues Rastorguyev22. This means that informa-
tional war is a struggle between different belief systems. According to 
the theory of this Russian academic, the growing importance of know-
ledge of different information systems capabilities is dictated by the fact 
that more and more emphasis is put on “informative weapons” instead 
of firearms.23
Collective memory as the resource in information warfare
When speaking about collective memory as one of the fundamental 
instruments in information warfare arsenal, we should start by pointing 
out that French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs is generally recognized 
as the founding father of collective memory research. He came up with 
his definition of collective memory in 1925. In his opinion, collective 
memory is a function of social power. He is convinced that our memory 
is influenced by the society. For him there is no such thing as individual 
memory per se, rather individual’s memory is pervaded by social frame-
work. Halbwachs described collective memory as “a reconstruction of 
the past that adapts the image of ancient facts to the beliefs and spiritual 
needs of the present”24.
The concept of “collective memory” rests upon assumption that eve-
ry social group develops a memory of its past; a memory that empha-
sizes its uniqueness and allows it to preserve its self-image and pass it on 
21 Расторгуев, С. П. (1999). Информационная война. Москва: Радио и связь. P. 7.
22 Ibid. P. 67.
23 Ibid. P. 6.
24 Halbwachs, M. (1999). On Collective Memory. Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press. P. 38.
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to future generations.25 Collective memory defines relations between 
the individual and the community to which it belongs and enables the 
community to bestow meaning upon its existence. Following this basic 
assertion, we can summarize the main features of the concept of collec-
tive memory through five characteristics that illuminate its complexity:
1. Collective memory is a socio-political construct: As such, col-
lective memory cannot be considered as evidence of the authenticity 
of a shared past, rather, collective memory is a version of the past, se-
lected to be remembered by a given community (or more precisely by 
particular agents in it) in order to advance its goals and serve its self-
perception. Such memory is defined and negotiated through changing 
socio-political power circumstances and agendas.
2. The construction of collective memory is a continuous, mul-
ti-directional process: Current events and beliefs guide our reading of 
the past, while schemes and frames of reference learned from the past 
shape our understanding of the present. The process of shaping collec-
tive memory is neither linear nor logical, but rather dynamic and con-
tingent.
3. Collective memory is functional: Social groups commemorate 
their past for different purposes, chiefly to define and chart the 
boundaries of communities, enabling their members to define group 
membership in contrast to the “other” and to reaffirm the group’s core 
convictions and inner hierarchy.
4. Collective memory must be concretized: Collective memory 
is a theoretical concept that deals with abstract ideals, but in order for it 
to become functional, it must be concretized and materialized through 
physical structures and cultural artefacts such as commemorative ritu-
als, monuments, historical museums, educational systems, the Internet 
and more.
5. Collective memory is narrational: Memory must be structured 
within a familiar cultural pattern. In most cases, it takes the well-known 
25 Neiger, M., Meyers, O., Zandberg, E. (eds.) (2011). On Media Memory.  Collective Me-
mory in a New Media Age. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. P. 4.
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narrative form, including a storyline featuring a beginning, a chain of 
developing events, and an ending, as well as protagonists who are called 
upon to overcome obstacles and so forth. Moreover, the adoption of a 
narrative structure enables creators of accounts that address the past to 
charge these tales with lessons and morals that guide and instruct mne-
monic communities in the present.26
After Halbwachs, many scholars of various academic disciplines 
have researched this field. In this paper, particular attention has been 
paid to those authors who have especially emphasized that manipu-
lation of collective memory had often been used to achieve political 
goals. Monroe E. Price writes that in many cases, those in power, faced 
with the opportunity or need for propaganda, use media: (a) to play on 
memories; (b) to contrast the painful present with a glorious past; (c) 
to create or reinterpret a past to justify aggressiveness in the present; 
(d) to change perceptions of the present through manipulation of a 
sense of history. In this respect, information warfare includes public di-
plomacy measures, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political 
and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, 
infiltration of computer networks and databases and efforts to promote 
dissident or opposition movements across computer networks27. Price 
points out that collective memory of defining events shapes and sus-
tains national identity. Even in times of peace, states maintain – or even 
construct – such memories as sources both for shared national identity 
and for the legitimacy of state power28. As an example of such trend in 
political communication Price uses the case study of Balkan wars dur-
ing 1990s. In his research, Price concludes that information interven-
tion describes efforts by those in power – an international force or local 
authority – to use media to shape collective memory of the past so as 
to influence present and future activity. “Media regulation and exploita-
26 Ibid. P.5.
27 Monroe, P. (2002). Memory, the media and NATO: information intervention in Bosnia-
Hercegovina. Cambridge University Press. P. 138.
28 Ibid. P. 139.
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tion is commonly used by the controlling group or groups to reinforce 
its ideal notion of identity and history,” stresses Price, pointing out that 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina media law was used to establish parameters of 
what memories could and could not be articulated29. Price insists that 
collective memory of defining events shapes and sustains national iden-
tity. Even in times of peace, states maintain – or even construct – such 
memories as sources both for shared national identity and for the legiti-
macy of state power.
Although Dan Berkowitz acknowledges that the notion of collective 
memory directly contradicts the professional journalistic paradigm’s 
core tenet of objectivity that calls for new occurrences to be treated in-
dependently journalism draws on historical memory on a regular basis 
to add perspective through commemoration, historical analogies, and 
presentation of historical contexts.30 “The concept of collective memo-
ry is a rich cultural approach for understanding how news comes to be,” 
writes Berkowitz. This author argues that, in essence, news grows from 
the values of the society that creates and consumes it. “Those values are 
delivered through familiar news narratives that help heal during trau-
mas and make the unfamiliar more comfortable. By doing so, collective 
memory helps connect those timeless stories to a tangible construction 
of a society’s history, turning new events from something generic to 
something reflecting that which society holds dear”, concludes Berko-
witz31, who in his research analysed the way how collective memory 
has been incorporated into news stories about the shootings at Virginia 
Tech and the Obama presidential campaign in 2008.
In this regard, also noteworthy is Eric Hobsbawm’s and Terence 
Ranger’s work “The Invention of Tradition”, where authors demons-
29 Ibid. P. 153.
30 Berkowitz, D. (2011). Telling the Unknown through the Familiar: Collective Memory 
as Journalistic Device in a Changing Media Environment. In On Media Memory. Col-
lective Memory in a New Media Age, M. Neiger, O. Meyers, E. Zandberg (eds.). New 
York:  Palgrave Macmillan. P. 202.
31 Ibid.
103
JOURNALISM RESEARCH • Science journal (Communication and information) • 2015 Nr. 8
trate that political authorities can and do invent past that justify their 
authority.  According to these two authors, “invented tradition” is taken 
to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly ac-
cepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate 
certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automati-
cally implies continuity with the past. “In fact, where possible, they 
normally attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic past”, 
stresses Hobsbawm and Ranger. 32
Therefore, to summarize those opinions on collective memory, it 
can be concluded that collective memory can be understood as a multi-
directional process of turning a narrative of the past into a functional, 
socio-political construct. And as notes Jill Edy, professor of communi-
cations at the University of Oklahoma,, journalism draws on historical 
memory on a regular basis to add perspective to information through 
commemoration, historical analogies, and presentation of historical 
context33.
Methodology
To achieve the aim of this research, critical discourse analysis is used 
as the main method. Since the research object is a number of articles 
that were published in the Russian language newspaper “Vesti Segodn-
ya”, the approach of critical discourse analysis developed by Norman 
Fairclough was chosen for the analysis.  For Fairclough critical discourse 
analysis (CDA) means the analysis of relationships between concrete 
language use and the wider social cultural structures. He atributes three 
dimensions to every discursive event. It is simultaneously text, discur-
sive practice – which also includes the production and interpretation of 
texts – and social practice. The analysis is conducted according to these 
three dimensions. N. Fairclugh writes: “Language is no autonomous 
32 Hobsbawm, E., Ranger, T. (1983). The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge University 
Press. P. 1.
33 Berkowitz, D. (2011). News as Collective Memory. Cultural Meanings of News: A Text-
Reader. London: Sage Publication. P. 301.
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construct, simply a system of sentences, but language as discourse, as 
action; similary, society is no mosaic of individual existences looked 
in some stratified structure but a dynamic formation of relationships 
and practices constituted in large measure by struggles for power; pro-
fessions not as guilds but as institutions whose conventions are ideo-
logically shaped by such social relationships and realised through such 
particular discourses”34.  Textual analysis involves the analysis of the 
way propositions are structured and the way propositions are combined 
and sequenced35. Analysis of texts covers traditional forms of linguistic 
analysis – analysis of vocabulary and semantics, the grammar of sen-
tences and smaller units, and the sound system and writing system. But 
it also includes textual organisation above sentence, including the ways 
in which sentences are connected together and things like the organisa-
tion of truth-taking in interviews or the overall structure of a newspaper 
article. For Fairclough discourse analysis becomes CDA only in the se-
cond stage of the analysis, where the research process involves an analy-
sis of texts as they are embedded within, and relate to, social conditions 
of production and consumptions36. Though Richardson points out that 
this aspect of CDA remains the most under-developed. Thirdly, Fair-
clough suggests that a fully rounded critical discourse analysis should 
involve an analysis of the text’s “socio-cultural practice” or “the social 
cultural goings-on which the communicative event is part of ”. This level 
of analysis may be at different levels of abstraction from the particular 
event. It may involve its more immediate situational context, the wider 
context of institutional practices the event is embedded within, or the 
yet wider frame of the society and the culture. “For instance, we could 
ask what does this text say about the society in which it was produced 
and the society that it was produced for?”, explains Richardson37.
34 Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and power. London: Longman Group UK Limited. P. vii.
35 Richardson, J. (2007). Analysing Newspapers. An Approach from Critical Discourse Ana-
lysis. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. P. 38.
36 Ibid. P. 39.
37 Ibid.
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What is particulary useful in Fairclough’s approach to critical dis-
course analysis, is that the author puts great emphasis upon “common-
sense assumptions” which are implicit in the conventions according to 
which people interact linguistically, and of which people are generally 
not consciously aware. Fairlcough calls “common-sense assumptions” 
as “ideologies”. And for him “ideologies” are closely linked to both po-
wer and language. “The nature of ideological assumptions embedded in 
particular convention depends on the power relations which underlie 
the conventions. (...) Ideologies are closely linked to language, because 
using language is the commonest form of social behaviour, and the form 
of social behaviour where we rely mostly on “common-sense assump-
tions”, argues Fairclough.38 On the other hand, Steven Lukes points out 
the use of the concept of power in the context of social relations means 
to talk about the agents who operate in groups or organisations, which 
actively or passively are able to influence thoughts or actions of others. 
In addition, Michel Foucault in his theory of discourse analysis has paid 
particular attention to the power relations that are expressed through 
language and different practices. He writes: “It seems to me that po-
wer must be understood in the first instance as the multiplicity of force 
relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization; as the process which, through cease-
less struggles and confrontations, transforms, strengthens, or reverses 
them; as the support which these force relations find in one another, 
thus forming a chain or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions 
and contradictions which isolate them from one another; and lastly, as 
the strategies in which they take effect, whose general design or institu-
tional crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formula-
tion of the law, in the various social hegemonies”.39
The aim of the critical discourse analysis in this research is to de-
monstrate the incorporation of collective memory into the news stories 
38 Fairclough, N. (1989). Language and power. London: Longman Group UK Limited. P. 2.
39 Foucault, M. (1978). History of Sexuality. Volume 1. An Introduction. New York: Pan-
theon Books. P. 92-93.
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in order to achieve political goals. It is done through analysing 22 artic-
les that were published in the Russian language newspaper in Latvia 
“Vesti Segodnya” during the year of 2014. These 22 articles were chosen 
for analysis because they use historical facts and analogies to describe 
current situation in Ukraine. This research paper analyses publications 
about the war in Ukraine, however, since the newspaper is published 
in Latvia, it is obvious that these publications are targeted to the au-
diences in Latvia and therefore, create circumstances in which collec-
tive memory can be identified as the resource in Russian information 
warfare against Latvia. Although it is necessary to stress that “Vesti Se-
godnya” provides its readers with a large amount of historical articles, 
thus promoting the concept of “Russian world”, which are devoted to 
Russian people who have lived in the territory of Latvia for a long time, 
this research paper pays particular attention to the examples of how 
collective memory had been incorporated into news stories about the 
Ukrainian war, as it is currently undoubtedly the top priority in regional 
security and in intergovernmental relationships in Europe and Russia. 
The newspaper “Vesti Segodnya” was chosen for the analysis because it 
is the only Russian language daily newspaper in Latvia.
The analysis of publications consists of two parts – the textual analy-
sis and discursive analysis of articles. Firstly, during the textual analysis 
of the “Vesti Segodnya” newspaper, the articles, where current situa-
tion in Ukraine is described using analogies to history and where basic 
historical concepts are used to explain ongoing war in eastern Ukraine, 
are identified. Secondly, these concepts are analysed according to the 
social and political events in society and key strategic concepts of the 
Russian Federation, which are included in the 2007 Russian Foreign 
Policy Concept, the 2009 Russian State Security Strategy and the 
2013 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept. These documents spell out the 
following objective in the media domain: “Russia’s main task is to create 
effective information campaign everywhere, where the real challenges 
to Russia’s interests have been detected, by maintaining a wide public 
consensus about the direction of Russia’s Foreign Policy.” Therefore, 
“Russia will develop its own effective means of information influence 
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on public opinion abroad, strengthen the role of Russian media in the 
international information environment providing them with essential 
state support” and “take necessary measures to counteract information 
threats to its sovereignty and security”40.
The third part of Fairclough’s approach to critical discourse analy-
sis is left aside intentionally, because it takes more information and 
more data to analyse “the wider frame of the society and the culture”, 
as Faircoulgh puts it.41 However this article is part of a more extensive 
research, and the third dimension of Fairclough’s approach will be in-
troduced in an upcoming work.  Therefore, the design of this analysis 
consists of two parts:
1) identification of usage of historical facts and analogies to describe 
current situation in Ukraine;
2) analysis of these publications regarding Kremlin politics. 
Textual analysis of articles
Most of the publications, which were printed in “Vesti Segodnya” 
and which were analysed in this research, were reprinted from Russian 
news sites “svpressa.ru” (ten articles), “lenta.ru” (four articles), “gazeta.
ru” (two articles) and “pravda.ru” (two articles). And only four articles 
that were analysed were written by local journalists of “Vesti Segodnya”. 
These articles were chosen for analysis because they consisted of the 
most evident usage of historical analogies describing current situation 
in Ukraine.
In the beginning of 2014, when President of Ukraine Viktor Yanuko-
vych was thrown from power, there were two articles in which ongoing 
conflict in Ukraine was compared with the situation in Yugoslavia in 
1990s. Nevertheless, in most cases in these 22 articles demonstrations 
in the Maidan square of Kiev were compared with a situation during 
40 2013 Russia’s Foreign Policy Concept. Retrieved from: http://archive.mid.ru//
brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D.
41 Richardson, J., Burridge, J. (2011). Analysing Media Discourses. Routledge, Taylor and 
Francis Group: London, New York. P. 49.
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both the First and Second World War. In the first example demonstra-
tors were characterized as the followers of Ukrainian militarist and po-
litical activist Simon Petlura, who fought against Red army and was an 
ally to former head of Poland, marshal Juzef Pilsudski. In the second 
example demonstrators were identified as Ukrainian nationalist figh-
ters from Bukovina region. Furthermore, regarding the creation of his-
torical parallels with the times of the Second World War, there were 
articles – both in the news pages and editorials – where demonstra-
tors against the V. Yanukovych regime were compared with fighters of 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army that fought against Nazi Germany, Soviet 
Army and Polish military units during the Second World War. In ano - 
t her case “Vesti Segodny” republished an article from a British newspa-
per “The Guardian”. Miln who was the author of this article stated that 
“at the heart of Kiev protest was ultra-nationalists and fascists”42.
On September 11, 2014, newspaper “Vesti Segodnya” printed an 
article, which was previously published in different pro-Kremlin news 
sites. The article claimed that volunteer battalions in Donbas not only 
use the fascist runes, but also wear Nazi outfits. Furthermore, this ar-
ticle quotes the British tabloid “The Daily Mail”, stating that Russian 
forces use similar tactics as Nazi Germany in the operation Barbadosa. 
However, this evaluation is lost in transition, because Russian language 
newspaper misinterprets this assessment by saying that British newspa-
per has acknowledged that Ukrainian army fights like the Nazi. “Vesti 
Segodnya” writes: “Kiev uses tactic which is similar to that of the fascist 
“Luftwaffe”. Experts inform about the danger of Obama’s military so-
lution to Ukrainian crisis”. Besides, this article states that “Ukrainian 
ultra-nationalists now take official positions in state institutions, army 
and police”43.
The article titled “Banderovskij Ordnung” (which can be translated 
as “Banderas Order”) that was reprinted from the Russian newsite “sv-
pressa.ru” can be mentioned as another example of collective memory 
42 “Кто в центре украинского кризиса?”, Vesti Segodnya. January 31, 2014.
43 “Каратели гордятся свастиками”, Vesti Segodnya. September 11, 2014.
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being incorporated into news stories. The author of this article informs 
that new Ukrainian government is planning “derussification of popu-
lation” and “severing cultural and historical links with Russian world”. 
According to author’s sources, “political council of “Right sector”44 has 
worked out the plan.
In March 2014, a particular place in the newspaper “Vesti Segod-
nya” was devoted to the annexation of Ukrainian peninsula Crimea. 
For example, newspaper’s authors argue that annexation of Crimea 
helped Putin to strengthen his image as “strong leader, who is ready 
to defend national interests and submit himself to even unfavourable 
circumstances”45. Besides, as “Vesti Segodnya” mentions, annexation of 
Crimea made a “good foundation for consolidation of society against 
the threats of liberals”46. But reporting on the so-called independence 
referendum of Ukrainian peninsula, “Vesti Segodnya” wrote about the 
“return of strayed Crimea” and “Victory Day in Crimea” (Victory Day 
is traditionally associated with the celebrations of the end of WWII), 
and concludes that “Crimea is taken”47. Furthermore, the newspaper 
praises Vladimir Putin who “has made his name in the annals of Rus-
sian history”. “After all, no one has joined Russia since 1940,”48 argues 
“Vesti Segodnya”, indirectly saying that occupation of the Baltic States 
was actually a voluntary accession of Baltics into the Soviet Union.
Discursive analysis of articles
In order to strive to accomplish the first part of Fairclough’s criti-
cal discourse analysis, it is necessary to analyse the social conditions of 
production and consumption of the text. This means to comply with 
the second dimension of Faircough’s approach to CDA, according to 
which it is necessary to analyse not only the organisational aspects of 
44 “Бандеровский Ordnung”, Vesti Segodnya. September 1, 2014.
45 “Зачем Путину Крым.” Vesti Segodnya. March 4, 2014.
46 Ibid.
47 “Возвращение блудного Крыма.” Vesti Segodnya. March 18, 2014.
48 “День победы в Крыму!” Vesti Segodnya. March 19, 2014.
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“Vesti Segodnya”, but also the coherence of the content of these media 
products with the official political course of Russian Federation.
Already in 2013, chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation, 
general Valery Gerasimov, stressed in his article, published in the Rus-
sian state-funded journal “Voyenno-promyshlenny kuryer”, that “the 
role of nonmilitary means of achieving political and strategic goals has 
grown, and, in many cases, they have exceeded the power of force of 
weapons in their effectiveness”. Furthermore, Gerasimov even speaks 
about the “military means of a concealed character, including carrying 
out actions of informational conflict and the actions of special-opera-
tion forces”.
Russia has successfully created its “information sphere”, and the bor-
ders of this sphere are not the same as geographical borders. In the cent-
re of this “information teritory” there is a concept of Russian World, 
which is spread in the territory of the former Soviet Union. Already in 
2001, Vladimir Putin stated: “The notion Russian World has from time 
immemorial extended far beyond the geographical boundaries of Rus-
sia and even far beyond the boundaries of the Russian ethnos. Tens of 
millions of people speaking, thinking and, perhaps, more important – 
feeling Russian live outside the Russian Federation.”49 It is not a secret 
that these people have become a resource of the Russian foreign policy.
Furthermore, in 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept it is stated 
that Russia “will take necessary measures to ensure national and inter-
national information security, prevent political, economic and social 
threats to the state’s security that emerge in information space”. In this 
document Russian officials acknowledge that “soft power” is a “compre-
hensive toolkit for achieving foreign policy objectives building on civil 
society potential, information, cultural, and other methods and tech-
nologies alternative to traditional diplomacy”.50
49 Maliukevičius, N. (2013).(Re)Constructing Russian Soft Power in Post Soviet Regi-
on. Baltic Security&Defence Review, 15 (2). P. 84.
50 2013 Russian Foreign Policy Concept. Retrieved from: http://archive.mid.ru//
brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D.
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Considering newspaper “Vesti Segodnya” as one of the resources 
for Russian information operations and the fact that the owners of this 
newspaper are connected to Russian authorities, the articles that are 
published in this newspaper are part of the Russian information cam-
paigns in Latvia. Besides that, when reporting about events in eastern 
Ukraine, the editors of “Vesti Segodnya” reprinted articles that were pre-
viously published in the news sources close to Kremlin officials. As an 
example of such trend, publications reprinted from “svpressa.ru”, “prav-
da.ru”, etc can be mentioned. Thus, Russian-speaking community in 
Latvia is exposed to official Kremlin lexicon to a large extent. According 
to it, there are no Russian soldiers on the soil of Ukraine, annexation of 
the Crimean peninsula is voluntary accession into Russia or “returning 
to the motherland”, Kiev’s fascists junta attacks civilians living in Don-
bas region and Donetsk, and Luhansk militias and teroristic gangs are 
considered as separatists fighting for their freedom from Kiev’s fascists, 
which in addition are a puppet government of United States of America.
The usage of historical analogies when talking about current events 
in Ukraine allows the Russian public opinion makers to use traumatic 
past to justify aggression in Ukraine. This kind of appealing to emo-
tions ensures that the reports will affect the public’s minds and hearts at 
the largest possible extent. In the 2013 Russia Foreign Policy Concept 
it is even underlined that one of the Russia’s foreign policy aims is to 
counteract “attempts to rewrite history using it to build confrontation 
and provoke revanchism in global politics and to revise the outcomes 
of World War II”. Needless to say that “attempts to rewrite history” is 
defined as historical knowledge which is opposite to that of Moscow’s. 
In practice this means incorporation of collective memory into publi-
cations that portray Ukrainian government as Kiev’s junta, Ukrainian 
army and its supporters as fascists and that questions the statehood of 
Ukraine. The communicative goal of such publications is to persuade 
readers about their belonging to the Russian culture and values, con-
trary to the Western liberal civilization standards. This is achieved by 
spreading the myth of Russia’s sphere of influence which intentions, ac-
cording to Kremlin, stretch across the former Soviet Union.
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Conclusions
Although it can be concluded that the use of collective memory in 
order to create resonance with the current events in Ukraine can be 
identified, it is very complicated to indisputably assert that collective 
memory has been incorporated into news stories deliberately to achieve 
political goals, since there is a lack of theoretical foundations of infor-
mation warfare concept on which such conclusions can be grounded. 
This is the direction in which it is necessary to continue to work.
Nevertheless, in its articles newspaper “Vesti Segodnya” is trying 
to create or reinterpret a past to justify aggressiveness in the present, 
for example, by comparing Ukrainian army with the nationalist move-
ments from Second World War with whom Donbass rebels (not Rus-
sian soldiers as it is stated by the Russian language newspaper) are 
fighting. This example clearly demonstrates that in the Russian infor-
mation operations great emphasis has been put on the interpretation 
of both historical facts and nowadays events. Critical discourse analy-
sis of articles about Ukraine which were published in newspaper “Vesti 
Segodnya” clearly demonstrates how supporters of Kremlin politics 
and distributors of Russia’s official agenda use collective memory and 
historical analogies to create for themselves and the Russian authori-
ties a favourable public opinion, which later can be transformed into a 
political asset for achieving socio-political goals, namely, to influence 
decision making process.
Traditionally, in the Russian information operations much atten-
tion has been devoted to psychological aspects. The current Russian 
information operations is no exception and today Russia has allocated 
a lot of money to implement information operations in the so-called 
cognitive dimension of information environment. This dimension en-
compasses the minds of those who transmit, receive, and respond to or 
act on information. As such, this dimension, according to information 
warfare theorists, constitutes the most important component of the in-
formation environment.
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